We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.
are among the main reasons why water management is becoming an important issue. For example, The Economist drew attention towards the impending water crisis in China. 2 Some of the main problems in China have been due to bad management, pollution and pricing of water below cost. Thus, it is now well accepted by policy makers that allocating water within the existing allocation mechanisms is often inefficient. The need for market-based mechanisms in water management has been gaining acceptance in various forums. 3 In its 1993 policy paper (Water Resources Management 4 ), the World Bank states that the deterioration and scarcity of fresh water in recent times is due to the "…failure to properly consider the economic value of water. Given that water is given little or no economic value it is misallocated and misused". However, the extraction process is not the only concern of the authorities involved. In recent years, an increasing number of city councils around the world use recycled water for drinking 5 , mixing streams that feed into reservoirs 6 or injecting recycled water into ground aquifers. In Australia, with its scarce water resources, water recycling is now set to play a much greater part in the water management cycle. 7 Thus, the quality resulting from the mixture of different types of water under different institutional settings is an important issue which has received scant attention so far.
In this paper we build a theoretical model and study experimentally how market structure affects the management of two different water resources. 8 We experimentally study how different market structures such as a private monopoly, a duopoly and public utility may affect water resource extraction and stock management. Furthermore, we assume that quality is endogenously determined from the mixture of different types of water. Market clears following a complex process based on block rate pricing and a smart mechanism, related to the one used in Murphy et al. (2000), enabling us to abstract from demand-side behaviour.
Increasingly, experimental methods are being applied to study alternative auctions, rules and market structures in a controlled environment at a reduced cost. Laboratory experiments are useful in providing valuable insights that can reduce the uncertainty associated with the implementation of new institutions (see Plott 1987). The usefulness of applying the experimental methodology lies in the fact that the laboratory can be a useful test bed to undertake a direct test of an existing market mechanism (Murphy et al. 2000 , 2009 and Garrido 2007 or study some proposed new systems. To quote (Smith 1976, pp. 274-275), "Laboratory experience suggests that all of the characteristics of 'real world' behavior that we consider to be of primitive importance [...] arise naturally, indeed inevitably, in experimental settings. Furthermore, the process of experimental design forces one to articulate rules and procedures, the collection of which forms an institution, organization, or 'body of law' with striking 'real world' parallels" (cf. Shubik 1974). The strength of laboratory experiments lies in the fact that institutional rules and incentives are clearly defined. The fact that laboratory experiments are regularly used in the design of auction mechanisms for a broad spectrum of markets lends support to this argument. In that sense, the use of abstract and controlled settings serves sim-
